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Abstract
We study a Stackelberg type symmetric dynamic multi-players zero-sum game. One
player is the leader and other players are followers. All players have symmetric payoﬀ
functions. The game is a two-stages game. In the ﬁrst stage the leader determines the value
of its strategic variable. In the second stage the followers determine the values of their
strategic variables given the value of the leader’s strategic variable. On the other hand, in
the static game all players simultaneously determine the values of their strategic variables.
We show that if and only if the game is fully symmetric, the Stackelberg equilibrium and
the static equilibrium are equivalent.
Keywords: Stackelberg equilibrium, static equilibrium, multi-players zero-sum game.
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the relation between the equilibrium of the Stackelberg type dynamic
game and the equilibrium of the static game in a multi-players zero-sum game, and show that
if and only if the game is fully symmetric, the equilibrium of the Stackelberg type dynamic
game and the equilibrium of the static game are equivalent. In a two-person zero-sum game
the equilibrium of the Stackelberg type dynamic game and the equilibrium of the static game
are equivalent1. WE extend this analysis to a general multi-players zero-sum game.
In the next section, using a model of relative proﬁt maximization in an oligopoly with
four ﬁrms, we show that the Stackelberg equilibrium is not equivalent to the static (Cournot)
equilibrium in the following cases which are not fully symmetric.
This work was supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science KAKENHI Grant Number 15K03481
and 18K01594.
†yatanaka@mail.doshisha.ac.jp
1Please see Korzhyk et. al. (2014), Ponssard and Zamir (1973), Tanaka (2014) and Yin et. al. (2010).
1. All ﬁrms are asymmetric, that is, they have diﬀerent cost functions.
2. Two followers are symmetric, that is, they have the same cost functions.
3. Three followers are symmetric.
4. The leader and one follower are symmetric.
5. The leader and two followers are symmetric.
The Stackelberg equilibrium is equivalent to the static (Cournot) equilibrium if and only if all
ﬁrms are symmetric, that is, they have the same cost functions.
In Section 3 we show the main result. All players have symmetric payoﬀ functions. One
player is the leader and other players are followers. The game is a two-stages game as follows;
1. In the ﬁrst stage the leader determines the value of its strategic variable.
2. In the second stage the followers determine the values of their strategic variables given
the value of the leader’s strategic variable.
On the other hand, in the static game all players simultaneously determine the values of their
strategic variables. We show that the equilibrium of the Stackelberg type dynamic game and
the equilibrium of the static game are equivalent if and only if the game is fully symmetric.
2 Example: relative profit maximization in a
Stackelberg oligopoly
In the example in this section we consider relative proﬁt maximization in an oligopoly2.
2.1 Case 1: four firms are different each other
Suppose a four ﬁrms Stackelberg oligopoly with a homogeneous good. There are Firms A, B,
C and D. The outputs of the ﬁrms are xA, xB , xC and xD. The price of the good is p. The
inverse demand function is
p D a   xA   xB   xC   xD; a > 0:
The cost functions of the ﬁrms are cAxA, cBxB , cCxC and cDxD. cA, cB , cC and cD are
positive constants. We assume that cA, cB , cC and cD are diﬀerent each other. The relative
proﬁt of Firm A is
'A D pxA   cAxA   1
3
.pxB   cBxB C pxC   cCxC C pxD   cDxD/:
2About relative proﬁtmaximization in an oligopoly seeMatsumura,Matsushima andCato (2013), Vega-Redondo
(1997), Satoh and Tanaka (2014a) and Satoh and Tanaka (2014b).
2
The relative proﬁt of Firm B is
'B D pxB   cBxB   1
3
.pxA   cAxA C pxC   cCxC C pxD   cDxD/:
The relative proﬁt of Firm C is
'C D pxC   cCxC   1
3
.pxA   cAxA C pxB   cBxB C pxD   cDxD/;
The relative proﬁt of Firm D is
'D D pxD   cDxD   1
3
.pxA   cAxA C pxB   cBxB C pxC   cCxC /:
The ﬁrms maximize their relative proﬁts. We see
'A C 'B C 'C C 'D D 0:
Thus, the game is a zero-sum game. Firm A is the leader and Firms B, C and D are followers.
In the ﬁrst stage of the game Firm A determines xA, and in the second stage Firms B, C and D
determine xB , xC and xD given xA.
Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 2aC cD C cC C cB   5cA
8
; xB D 2aC cD C cC   5cB C cA
8
;
xC D 2aC cD   5cC C cB C cA C 2a
8
; xD D 2a   5cD C cC C cB C cA
8
:
Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 18aC 19cD C 19cC C 19cB   75cA
72
;
xB D 18aC 7cD C 7cC   47cB C 15cA
72
;
xC D 18aC 7cD   47cC C 7cB C 15cA
72
;
xD D 18a   47cD C 7cC C 7cB C 15cA
72
:
TheNash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game are not equivalent.
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2.2 Case 2: the leader and one follower are symmetric
Assume cD D cA.
Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 2aC cC C cB   4cA
8
; xB D 2aC cC   5cB C 2cA
8
;
xC D 2a   5cC C cB C 2cA
8
; xD D 2aC cC C cB   4cA
8
:
Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 18aC 19cC C 19cB   56cA
72
;
xB D 18aC 7cC   47cB C 22cA
72
;
xC D 18a   47cC C 7cB C 22cA
72
;
xD D 18aC 7cC C 7cB   32cA
72
:
TheNash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game are not equivalent.
2.3 Case 3: two followers are symmetric
Assume cD D cC .
Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 2aC 2cC C cB   5cA
8
; xB D 2aC 2cC   5cB C cA
8
;
xC D 2a   4cC C cB C cA
8
; xD D 2a   4cC C cB C cA
8
:
4
Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 18aC 38cC C 19cB   75cA
72
;
xB D 18aC 14cC   47cB C 15cA
72
;
xC D 18a   40cC C 7cB C 15cA
72
;
xD D 18a   40cC C 7cB C 15cA
72
:
TheNash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game are not equivalent.
2.4 Case 4: the leader and two followers are symmetric
Assume cD D cC D cA.
Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 2aC cB   3cA
8
; xB D 2a   5cB C 3cA
8
;
xC D 2aC cB   3cA
8
; xD D 2aC cB   3cA
8
:
Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 18aC 19cB   37cA
72
;
xB D 18a   47cB C 29cA
72
;
xC D 18aC 7cB   25cA
72
;
xD D 18aC 7cB   25cA
72
:
TheNash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game are not equivalent.
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2.5 Case 5: three followers are symmetric
Assume cD D cC D cB .
Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 2aC 3cB   5cA
8
; xB D 2a   3cB C cA
8
;
xC D 2a   3cB C cA
8
; xD D 2a   3cB C cA
8
:
Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 6aC 19cB   25cA
24
;
xB D 6a   11cB C 5cA
24
;
xC D 6a   11cB C 5cA
24
;
xD D 6a   11cB C 5cA
24
:
TheNash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game are not equivalent.
2.6 Case 6: all firms are symmetric
Assume cB D cC D cD D cA.
Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D a   cA
4
; xB D a   cA
4
; xC D a   cA
4
; xD D a   cA
4
:
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Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D a   cA
4
; xB D a   cA
4
; xC D a   cA
4
; xD D a   cA
4
:
TheNash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game are equivalent.
3 Symmetric dynamic zero-sum game
There is an n-players and two-stages game. Players are called Player i , i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng. The
strategic variable of Player i is si ; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng . The set of strategic variable of Player i
is Si ; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng, which is a convex and compact set of a linear topological space. One
of players is the leader and other players are followers.
The structure of the game is as follows.
1. The ﬁrst stage
The leader determines the value of its strategic variable.
2. The second stage
Followers determine the values of their strategic variables given the value of the leader’s
strategic variable.
Thus, the game is a Stackelberg type dynamic game. We investigate a sub-game perfect
equilibrium of this game.
On the other hand, there is a static game in which all players simultaneously determine the
values of their strategic variables.
The payoﬀ of Player i is denoted by ui.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/. ui is jointly continuous and diﬀer-
entiable in si and sj ; j ¤ i . We assume
nX
iD1
ui.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/ D 0 given .s1; s2; : : : ; sn/:
Therefore, the game is a zero-sum game.
We also assume that the game is symmetric in the sense that the payoﬀ functions of all
players are symmetric, and assume that the sets of strategic variables for all players are the
same. Denote them by S .
We show the following theorem
Theorem 1. The sub-game perfect equilibrium of the symmetric Stackelberg type dynamic
zero-sum game is equivalent to the equilibrium of the static game.
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Proof. 1. The conditions for the equilibrium of the static game are
@ui.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@si
D 0; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng; (1)
given .s1; s2; : : : ; sn/. Since the game is symmetric, we can suppose that there exists
a symmetric equilibrium. We write it as .s; s; : : : ; s/ such that si D s for all
i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng.
The existence of a symmetric equilibrium is ensured by the ﬁxed point the-
orem. s is obtained as a ﬁxed point of the following function from S to
S .
f .s/ D argmax
si2S
ui.s; : : : ; s; si ; s; : : : ; s/:
Assume that argmaxsi2S ui.s; : : : ; s; si ; s; : : : ; s/ is single-valued. Since ui
is continuous, f .s/ is continuous. S is compact. Therefore, f .s/ has a ﬁxed
point.
2. Suppose that the leader of the dynamic game is Player 1. Other players are followers. In
the second stage of the game the followers determine their strategic variables tomaximize
their payoﬀs given the value of the strategic variable of Player 1. The conditions for
maximization of the payoﬀs of the followers are
@uj .s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@sj
D 0; j 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng: (2)
Denote the values of sj ; j 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng, obtained from (2) given s1 by
sj .s1/; j 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng:
By symmetry of the game for the players other than Player 1 we have
sj .s1/ D sk.s1/; k ¤ j; j; k 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng:
The responses of sj .s1/ to a change in s1 for each j 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng is written as
dsj
ds1
; j 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng:
We assume
dsj
ds1
¤ 0;
ˇˇˇˇ
dsj
ds1
ˇˇˇˇ
< 1; j 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng:
By symmetry, when all sj ; j 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng are equal, we have
dsj
ds1
D dsk
ds1
; k ¤ j; j; k 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng: (3)
8
Also, we get
@uj .s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@sj
D @uk.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@sk
; k ¤ j; j; k 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng:
In the ﬁrst stage of the game Player 1 determines s1 to maximize its payoﬀ taking the
behaviors of other players into account. The value of u1 with sj .s1/; j 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng
is
u1.s1; s2.s1/; s3.s1/; : : : ; sn.si//:
The condition for maximization of u1 in the dynamic game is
@u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@s1
C
nX
jD2
@u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@sj
dsj
ds1
D 0: (4)
By symmetry when sj D sk,
@u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@sj
D @u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@sk
; k ¤ j; k; j 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng:
From (3)
@u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@sj
dsj
ds1
D @u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@sk
dsk
ds1
; j ¤ k; j; k 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng:
Thus, when all sj ; j 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng are equal, (4) is rewritten as
@u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@s1
C .n   1/@u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@sj
dsj
ds1
D 0: (5)
Since the game is zero-sum
u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/C
nX
jD2
uj .s1; s2; : : : ; sn/ D 0:
This means
u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/ D  
nX
jD2
uj .s1; s2; : : : ; sn/:
By symmetry for the players other than Player 1, when sj D sk; j; k 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng,
u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/ D  .n   1/uj .s1; s2; : : : ; sn/:
Thus,
@u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@s1
D  .n   1/@uj .s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@s1
: (6)
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3. We show that the equilibrium of the static game .s; s; : : : ; s/, where si D s for all
i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng, satisﬁes the conditions for the equilibrium of the Stackelberg type
dynamic game.
Suppose a state such that s1 D s2 D    D sn. By symmetry of the game, si D sj ; j ¤
i; i; j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng means
@uj .s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@s1
D @u1.s1; s2; s3/
@sj
; j 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng: (7)
From (6) and (7)
 .n   1/@u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@sj
D @u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@s1
:
Substituting this into (5) yields,
@u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@s1
  @u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@s1
dsj
ds1
D 0:
Thus,
@u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@s1

1   dsj
ds1

D 0:
We get
@u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@s1
D 0;
because
ˇˇˇ
dsj
ds1
ˇˇˇ
< 1; j ¤ 1. From (2), this means
@u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@s1
D 0; @uj .s1; s2; : : : ; sn/
@sj
D 0; j 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng:
Since this is equivalent to (1), the equilibrium of the static game .s; s; : : : ; s/ satisﬁes
the conditions for the equilibrium of the Stackelberg type dynamic game.
If the game is not symmetric for Player 1 and another player, (7) does not hold, and then
the equilibrium of the dynamic game and that of the static game are not equivalent.
4 Concluding Remark
As we said in the introduction, the equivalence of the Stackelberg type dynamic game and the
static game in a two-players zero-sum game is a widely known result. But, this problem in
a multi-players case has not been analyzed. In this paper we have analyzed a multi-players
game and a case where payoﬀ functions are diﬀerentiable. In the future research we want to
prove the equivalence of the dynamic game and the static game when payoﬀ functions are not
assumed to be diﬀerentiable.
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